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In the early summer of 1992 in Schluchsee, a quiet little resort
town in Germany’s Schwarzwald, a small group of neuroscien-
tists were gathered around a television set in the lobby of a local
hotel. I had the good fortune to be one of them. The morning ses-
sion of the scientific meeting we were attending had just ended,
and everyone else had gone off to lunch. We had stayed behind
at the request of Giacomo Rizzolatti, Professor of Human Phys-
iology at the University Parma, who said he had something excit-
ing to show us and wanted our opinion about what it might mean.
He slipped a videotape into the tape deck that he had managed
to hook up to the hotel’s television set and pushed ‘‘play.’’
We found ourselves watching (and listening to) a video that
Rizzolatti had made a few weeks earlier in his laboratory in
Parma. In the video, a monkey was seated in a primate chair
and was reaching out to grasp morsels of food placed in front
of it by the experimenter, whom some of the scientists recog-
nized as Rizzolatti’s young associate, Leo Fogassi. We heard
the familiar ‘‘brrrrp’’ of a stream of action potentials every time
the monkey grasped a piece of food. Rizzolatti explained
that the neuron we were listening to was located in the ventral
premotor area, a brain region in the frontal lobes just in front of
primary motor cortex, which Rizzolatti and his group had been
studying since the early 1980s. So far, nothing on the tape
seemed out of the ordinary. The neuron appeared to be coding
the movements associated with grasping, just as many other
neurons had done in the past when Rizzolatti and his group
lowered microelectrodes into this region. Then something quite
remarkable happened. The camera turned from the monkey to
Leo Fogassi, who now, like the monkey, could be seen picking
up pieces of food with his fingers. But as all of us could hear,
the neuron continued to fire—and the timing of that firing was
locked to Leo’s grasping movements! All of us were stunned.
Rizzolatti had shown us a neuron that fired not only when the
monkey performed a particular action but also when the monkey
observed another individual, in fact a member of another species,
performing the same action. We didn’t know it at the time, but we
were among the first to witness a mirror neuron in action.
Nowadays, of course, anyone even remotely familiar with cog-
nitive neuroscience knows about mirror neurons. They are rou-
tinely invoked to explain everything from action recognition to
social cognition. As Rizzolatti explained in a recent interview
for the New York Times (Blakeslee, 2006), ‘‘Mirror neurons allow
us to grasp the minds of others not through conceptual reason-
ing but through direct simulation. By feeling, not by thinking.’’
There is no denying that the idea of our own brain (and thus
our own mind) resonating with the brains (and minds) of others
is a compelling one. Indeed, the demonstration of mirror neurons
at work is immediately captivating. Anyone who has seen Rizzo-
latti present the evidence cannot fail to be convinced that some-
thing important is being coded in those cells. Even now, more
than 15 years after the first screening of the video at Schluchsee,
Rizzolatti continues to show the footage of an ageless Leo
Fogassi picking up pieces of food in front of what must by now
be a long-dead monkey. He continues to show it because it is
such a convincing demonstration that neurons can code both
action and action observation. What this demonstration tells us
about what these neurons are doing, however, is quite another
matter.
Two new books have just been published on mirror neurons,
both reviewing the history of experimental work that led to the
development of the idea of mirror neurons and both discussing
the implications of mirror neurons for our understanding what it
is to be human. The first of these, Mirrors in the Brain: How
OurMinds Share Actions and Emotions, was written by Rizzolatti
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himself, together with Corrado Sinigaglia, a philosopher of
science at the University of Milan. The second book, Mirroring
People: The New Science of How We Connect with Others,
was written by Marco Iacoboni, a neurologist and neuroscientist
at the David Geffen School of Medicine at the University of Cal-
ifornia, Los Angeles, who has worked closely with some of the
scientists in the Rizzolatti lab. Iacoboni was one of the pioneers
in the study of what has become known as the ‘‘mirror neuron
system’’ in humans. Although both books go over much of the
same material, the approaches taken by the authors couldn’t
be more different. Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia have written a com-
prehensive review of the intricacies of mirror neurons, providing
a detailed account of the relationship between these neurons
and a range of sensory motor neurons in the frontoparietal cortex
of the primate brain. Iacoboni’s book is an altogether different
project. InMirroring People, Iacoboni has tried to write an acces-
sible account of mirror neurons that anyone with an interest in the
biological foundations of social behavior and the social brain
would find interesting.
The early chapters of Mirrors in the Brain (translated from the
Italian by Frances Anderson) review the pioneering work by
Rizzolatti and others on the organization of motor systems in
the primate brain. The main focus is on grasping and its relation-
ship with vision, the sensory system that provides most of the
information about the goal object. In telling their story, Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia make the important point, often ignored by many
cognitive neuroscientists, that the ultimate function of the brain is
to control our movements—and that the extended sensorimotor
circuitry that mediates this control also provides the neural sub-
strate for much of what we might describe as ‘‘higher’’ cognitive
functions. Indeed, the idea that our perception of action in
others—and our understanding of other’s intentions—depends
on the recruitment of motor circuitry is central to the concept
of mirror neurons.
As one might expect, most of the book is devoted to develop-
ing and extending the notion of mirror neuron systems. For Riz-
zolatti and Sinigaglia, the primary role of mirror neurons, even in
humans, is ‘‘understanding the meaning of the actions of others’’
(p. 124). When we see someone else performing an action, they
argue, it is through the immediate activation of motor areas of our
brain that we can decipher the meaning of that action. In other
words, the resonance between the sight of the action and our
motor system allows us to understand the goal of that action
without any conceptual or semantic mediation. As I said earlier,
this is a powerful and captivating idea. Indeed, some have
argued that the mirror neurons provided the evolutionary spring-
board for the emergence of language and culture in hominids.
One of the most visible promoters of this idea is V.S. Ramachan-
dran (2000), who has argued that the mirror neuron system
‘‘holds the key to understanding many enigmatic aspects of
human evolution. setting the stage for the complex Lamarck-
ian or cultural inheritance that characterizes our species and lib-
erates us from the constraints of a purely gene-based evolution.’’
In the penultimate chapter ofMirrors in the Brain,Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia discuss the possible role of mirror neurons in the evo-
lution of language—invoking the idea that language grew out of
a manual gestural system. It is no accident, they argue, that hand
and mouth mirror neurons are colocated in the ventral premotor
cortex of the monkey, a region that appears to be homologous
with Broca’s area in the human brain. Of course, as Rizzolatti
and Sinigaglia acknowledge, the idea that the motor systems re-
sponsible for controlling the orolaryngeal musculature have been
co-opted for speech recognition was already being advanced by
Alvin Liberman (Liberman, 1957; Liberman and Mattingly, 1985)
well before the mirror neuron craze began. Nevertheless, recent
experiments on the echo-mirror neuron system, in which the
perception of speech sounds is ‘‘echoed’’ in imperceptible
movements of the vocal apparatus, provides some indirect sup-
port for this notion (Fadiga et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2003).
In the last chapter of the book, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
propose that our understanding of emotions in other people
may require the activation of the same circuitry that generates
these emotions in ourselves—in a manner reminiscent of how
our understanding of the intentions of others activates mirror
neurons in our motor system. They argue that although we might
be able to discriminate emotional expression without the activa-
tion of a mirror emotional system, our perception of these emo-
tions would be, in the words of William James, ‘‘purely cognitive
in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth’’ (James,
1890, p. 450). In short, it is empathy that allows us to experience
emotions in others.
I must say that I really enjoyed reading Rizzolatti and Siniga-
glia’s book. It is true that there are a few hiccups in the translation
here and there (‘‘saccadici’’ for ‘‘saccades,’’ for example)—and
some sentences that are difficult to unpack. But all in all, this is
a ‘‘must read’’ for anyone interested in an authoritative and
sometimes personal account of the history of mirror neurons
and their (possible) role in action understanding, empathy, and
social cognition.
Iacoboni’s book, Mirroring People, covers much of the same
territory as Mirrors in the Brain but in a much more accessible
and chatty fashion. The book is full of personal anecdotes and
amusing stories that not only illuminate the science but also cap-
ture the excitement of the scientific enterprise. In the early chap-
ters, Iacoboni reviews the pioneering work by Rizzolatti and his
colleagues on monkeys and then jumps right into his own work
on the mirror neuron system in humans. He introduces the reader
to the intricacies of functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) and transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) without hid-
ing behind technical language—but at the same time acknowl-
edging the pitfalls and shortcomings associated with these and
other modern neuroscience methods.
In later chapters, Iacoboni discusses the implications of mirror
neurons and related brain circuitry for different aspects of the
human condition, everything from autism and drug abuse to mar-
keting and politics. Indeed, I think it is fair to say that Iacoboni
may be even more enthusiastic about mirror neurons than Ram-
achandran! In the last chapter of Mirroring People, Iacoboni
invokes the idea that mirror neurons may be the key to under-
standing how it is we relate to the world and our place within
it—making our interactions with other people ‘‘deeply meaning-
ful.’’ For this reason, he argues, the study of the mirror neuron
system should be called ‘‘existential neuroscience.’’
Not everyone is as enamored of the mirror neuron hypothesis
as Iacoboni is. Indeed, some have questioned the role of mirror
neurons even in something as simple as basic action recognition.
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After all, in order to for the mirror neuron to ‘‘recognize’’ Leo Fo-
gassi’s hand picking up the piece of food, the neuron has to re-
ceive highly processed input (even within a bootstrapping model)
from visual networks that have parsed the scene and extracted
form and motion information that presumably has been matched
to stored templates about what hands are supposed to look
like—as well as information about the goal and the relationship
between the hand and the goal (for a discussion of this issue,
see Csibra, 2005; Milner and Goodale, 2006). But if all that
work has already been done, what extra information is provided
by the firing of mirror neurons? Almost certainly, Rizzolatti and
Sinigaglia’s answer (and Iacoboni’s too) would be that the re-
cruitment of mirror neurons takes things beyond mere action
recognition into the realm of action understanding. The activa-
tion of mirror neurons enables the monkey to experience directly
what it is to grasp and eat a piece of food. Such implicit simula-
tion, it is argued, allows the monkey to understand the intentions
of others.
But this idea has also been challenged. Marc Hauser and his
colleagues, for example, have studied the ability of macaque
monkeys living in a colony on Cayo Santiago to figure out
whether or not a human is about to throw a rock at them
(Wood et al., 2007a). These Old World monkeys living on an
island colony in the Caribbean have a lot of experience with
rock-throwing humans—and, not surprisingly, they are remark-
ably good at distinguishing between a realistic throwing move-
ment and a partial throw or a throw that lacks sufficient torque
or force to be a threat. But the fact that the monkeys can do
this cannot be explained by appealing to mirror neurons. It turns
out that macaque monkeys are physically incapable of throwing
an object at a specific target, largely because of the anatomy and
physiology of their shoulders, hips, and buttocks. They might
throw their feces in your general direction at the zoo, but they
won’t be able to bean you with a well-aimed stone. On Cayo San-
tiago, the monkeys have never been observed throwing rocks at
each other. In short, it is extremely unlikely that macaque mon-
keys have mirror neurons for throwing stones. This means that
their understanding of stone-throwing by humans must depend
on other mechanisms. Indeed, Hauser has pointed out that this
dissociation between the monkeys’ ability to perceive throwing
in others and their ability to throw stones themselves resonates
with a growing body of evidence showing that animals can ex-
hibit perceptual competencies that do not show up in their motor
repertoire (Wood et al., 2007b), a conclusion that is consistent
with the idea that the perceptual systems that provide under-
standing of the world evolved separately (to some degree)
from the sensorimotor systems that mediate action in that world
(see also Goodale and Milner, 1992; Milner and Goodale, 2006).
Other objections to the mirror neuron hypothesis have come
from philosophers. Pierre Jacob, for example, has criticized
the attempts of some of the more ardent fans of mirror neurons
to extend the hypothesis to a simulation account of mind read-
ing, the cognitive ability to represent one’s own and others’
psychological states (e.g., Gallese and Goldman, 1998). Jacob
(2008) concedes that mirror neurons might indeed fire both
when a monkey (or human) executes an action toward a particu-
lar target and when the monkey (or human) observes someone
else doing the same thing. But the role of mirror neurons, Jacob
argues, is not to compute the observed agent’s goal (or his or her
intention), but to compute instead the motor commands that are
required to achieve the goal. In other words, mirror neurons are
seen as part of a system that computes an ‘‘inverse’’ internal
model of the agent’s actions, working backward from the per-
ceived representation of the agent’s goal to generate a model
(in the observer’s brain) of the motor commands necessary to
achieve that goal (see also Csibra, 2005). From this point
of view, the function of mirror neurons is to reveal not the agent’s
intentions but rather what his or her next motor act might
be. But as Jacob points out, if a mirror neuron ‘‘takes a represen-
tation of an agent’s prior intention as input and computes a
representation of motor commands suitable to achieving
this goal, then, of course, it does not generate a representation
of the agent’s prior intention’’ (Jacob, 2008, p. 21, italics added).
Simply put (according to Jacob), mirror neurons use information
about intentions to code the required actions, not vice versa.
So what do Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia and Iacoboni have to say
about all of this? One shortcoming ofMirrors in the Brain andMir-
roring People is that neither book deals with these kinds of cri-
tiques head on. Although one can certainly find arguments and
experimental findings in different places in Mirrors in the Brain
that speak to issues raised by the critics of the mirror neuron hy-
pothesis, it would have been useful if Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia
had devoted some part of the book to responding to their
more vocal critics in a point-by-point fashion. Understandably
perhaps, Iacoboni’s book, which is a much more popular ac-
count of mirror neurons, spends almost no time exploring other
interpretations of what mirror neurons might be doing—and, to
my mind at least, often overstates their role in action understand-
ing and the perception of intention. But perhaps this is asking too
much. The task that Iacoboni set himself was not to write a schol-
arly monograph full of nuance and qualification. He wanted to
write a book (and here I am doing a little mind reading of my
own) that would capture the exhilaration and intellectual excite-
ment of working on research that is central to what it is in our
brains that makes us social beings. With Mirroring People, he
has certainly succeeded.
I must confess that I was pretty excited myself when I first wit-
nessed a mirror neuron at work in the video that Rizzolatti
showed us in Schluchsee back in the summer of 1992. Hearing
that neuron fire when Leo Fogassi picked up a piece of food in
front of the monkey made it hard to resist the idea that such
neurons play a special role in the perception of actions in others.
But we shouldn’t be misled into thinking that the undeniably clear
correspondence in firing across action and action observation
means that these neurons play the pivotal role in action under-
standing. Equally critical coding is almost certainly taking place
in other neurons in the complex computational networks in which
mirror neurons participate—but that coding is much harder
to map onto what is happening out in the world. My guess is
that mirror neurons, as fascinating as they are, will turn out
to be only the beginning of what is likely to be a complicated story.
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